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Abstract
A two-country model with monopolistic competition and price stick-
iness is employed to investigate the implications for macroeconomic
stability and the welfare properties of three international policy ar-
rangements: (a) cooperative, (b) non-cooperative and (c) monetary
union. I characterize the conditions under which there is scope for pol-
icy cooperation and quantify the costs of non cooperation and mone-
tary union. The non-cooperative equilibrium may be suboptimal be-
cause of beggar-thy-neighbor and beggar-thyself eﬀects, while monetary
union may be suboptimal because of the sluggishness of relative prices.
Both the costs of policy competition and of a monetary union are sen-
sitive to the values assumed for the intertemporal and international
demand elasticity and the degree of openness of the economy. Inde-
pendently of the calibration scenario adopted, the ECB has little to
gain by coordinating with the Fed.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The aftermath of the European Monetary Union has changed the way macroe-
conomic policy has been conducted within and outside Europe. The estab-
lishment of a common currency has in fact created a major rival to the dollar
and yen in the international ﬁnancial markets. One question of crucial im-
portance for developments in the world economy is whether the central banks
of the United States, Japan and Europe should cooperate or not in pursu-
ing stabilization policies. The purpose of this paper is to study the welfare
properties and the implications for macroeconomic stability of diﬀerent in-
ternational monetary policy arrangements and to investigate whether and
how the ﬁrst best solution can be implemented in a decentralized setting.
To address the questions of interest, I use a two-country model where
each country is specialized in the production of a bundle of diﬀerentiated
goods, production is monopolistically competitive, prices are staggered and
there is no international price discrimination. Within this framework, I
examine three types of international policy arrangements: (a) cooperative,
(b) non-cooperative and (c) monetary union. Cooperation is modelled by
assigning the conduct of monetary policy to a ”supranational institution”
that maximizes a weighted average of the utility of the consumers of both
countries. Non-cooperation occurs when each central bank independently
maximizes the utility of the domestic consumers taking as given foreign
policy variables. Finally, monetary union can be viewed as “constrained
cooperation,” since the monetary authority can only use the interest rate
to achieve its goals, while the exchange rate is ﬁxed. I consider policies
under commitment: the monetary authorities cannot ignore past decisions
and thus the policies analyzed are not, in general, time consistent in the
sense of Kydland and Prescott (1977).
The question of whether central banks should coordinate their policy
actions is not new. Many authors in the past have analyzed similar issues:
2Hamada (1974), Oudiz and Sachs (1984) and Rogoﬀ (1985) are early con-
tributors to the literature. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001a, b) Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (2000) and Benigno and Benigno (2002) are more recent eﬀorts.
In this paper, I study the sources of conﬂict between the monetary pol-
icy objectives of two large economies and the extent to which diﬀerent types
of international policy arrangements may help overcome the suboptimal-
ity resulting from decentralized, non-cooperative decisions. I use a theo-
retical framework which encompasses the models of Corsetti and Pesenti
(2001a,b), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) and Benigno and Benigno (2002) as
speciﬁc cases. Contrary to these authors’, the general preferences speciﬁca-
tion adopted enables me to characterize the conditions under which there is
scope for international policy coordination, quantify the costs of the subop-
timal monetary arrangements for diﬀerent values of key parameters (such as
openness, substitutability between home and foreign goods and labor sup-
ply elasticity) and to assess the magnitude of the gains from cooperation.
Like previous work, the analysis ﬁnds that there is relatively little scope for
cooperation under either sets of arrangements. However, contrary to the
existing literature, it precisely pins down the logic of this result.
Optimal policies are derived using an objective criterion that approxi-
mates the utility of the representative consumer. Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998) ﬁrst derived this objective for a closed economy. In an open econ-
omy the central bank is concerned not only with the variability of inﬂation
and the output gap; it also takes into account the dynamics of the terms
of trade and its interaction with domestic demand. Relative prices enter
the welfare criterion because they play a crucial role in the transmission of
foreign shocks. It is the concern about optimal reallocation of resources be-
tween the two economies that translates in an objective for the social planner
which includes the variability of the deviations of the terms of trade and the
covariance between domestic consumption and relative price depreciations.
I show that the objective of independent central banks and of the so-
3cial planner coincide when three conditions are satisﬁed: the elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign goods and the intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution are equal to one and the degree of openness of the two
economies is small. In this case, since terms of trade movements have no
eﬀect on domestic consumption and inﬂation and there are no incentives for
policy competition and thus no gains from international policy coordina-
tion. (as in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b) and Benigno and Benigno (2002).
For unitary international demand elasticity cross-country consumptions are
equalized in equilibrium, independently of terms of trade movements. How-
ever, when this elasticity is diﬀerent from one, terms of trade movements
aﬀect relative consumption movements and national policymakers have in-
centives to use strategically the terms of trade to improve domestic relative
welfare. The value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is also cru-
cial for determining the incentives for policy competition: when preferences
are not logarithmic foreign variables aﬀect domestic inﬂation through terms
of trade movements and this foster competition among national policymak-
ers.
Under the general speciﬁcation employed, monetary policies are strate-
gic substitutes and coordinating monetary policy is potentially beneﬁcial.
Optimal policy under cooperation always achieves the ﬁr s tb e s ta n dc o m -
pletely stabilizes domestic prices in each country. The magnitude of the
costs from international policy competition depend on the parametrization
of the model: they increase with the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and
the international demand elasticity; with the labor supply elasticity and
with the degree of openness of the economy.
Because sustaining a (time-consistent) cooperative agreement between
the two countries is diﬃcult, I also analyze the welfare implications of a
monetary union, an arrangement which can be viewed as ”cooperation with
one instrument only” (the union-wide nominal interest rate). A monetary
union might generate welfare costs, because the distortions associated with
4the inertia of the terms of trade might dominate the gains of coordina-
tion (See, also Cooley and Quadrini (2002)). In the case of highly sub-
stitutable domestic and foreign goods, suﬃciently ﬂexible domestic prices,
and little home-bias in consumption, a monetary union improves upon non-
cooperative outcomes.
Should the ECB and the Fed cooperate? The answer is quite robust for
a wide range of parameter values and model speciﬁcations: although policy
cooperation does improve welfare, gains are quantitatively small. In order to
generate signiﬁcant gains from policy coordination, one has to assume high
degree of trade links between the Euro area and the US and unrealistically
high values for the international elasticity of substitution and for the risk
aversion coeﬃcient. However, when we ask whether the UK should join the
EMU, we ﬁnd that gains are signiﬁcant.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model.
Section 3 presents the welfare objective of the central bank in an open econ-
omy and Section 4 the calibration of the model. Section 5 studies optimal
monetary policy for each of the policy regimes. Section 6 presents simulation
results for a range of values of crucial parameters and Section 7 compares
non-cooperation with monetary union. Section 8 concludes. The appendices
contain the derivations of the relationships used.
2 The Model
Since the model is somewhat standard, I only brieﬂy outline its features. The
economy consists of two countries. Each country is populated by identical,
inﬁnitely lived agents. There is no migration. Each agent produces a single
diﬀerentiated good and consumes the goods produced in both economies.
52.1 Consumers
The consumption good is a composite of domestic and foreign goods:













where CH(CF) is a CES composite of the domestic (foreign) consumption
bundle and the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods is θ > 1;
η is the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods and
(1−α) measures the degree of home bias in consumption. I assume that η ≤
θ i.e., there is less substitutability across countries than within countries. If
α = 1
2, there is no home bias in consumption; that is, for any given relative
price, domestic and foreign consumers will demand the same quantities of
the domestic good. For α < 1
2, domestic consumers will always demand
relatively more domestic goods than foreign consumers.
Representative consumers in each country receive income from selling
their products, from asset holdings, and from transfers of the domestic
government. Households then consume, accumulate real money balances,
purchase new assets and split savings between money and other assets. In
each period t the economy experiences one of ﬁnitely many events xt. Let
ht denote the history of realized states from period zero until period t, i.e.,
ht = {x0,x 1,...,x t}. The probability, as of period zero, of any particular
history ht is π(ht). The initial realization x0 is given.
I assume that capital markets are complete. The consumers of both
countries purchase a portfolio of state-contingent home currency denomi-
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(1 − τ)PH(i,ht)Y (i,ht)+M(i,ht)+b(i,ht)+TR(i,ht)
(3)
6where P(ht), is the aggregate price index; b(i,ht) are nominal bonds; PH(i,ht)
is the price that the household i charges for its product Y (i,ht)a td a t et;
TR(i,ht) are nominal lump sum transfers from the domestic government to
domestic household i at date t and τ is a proportional income tax.
2.2 Consumption Risk Sharing








= Q(ht+1,h t)( 4 )
A condition analogous to (4) must hold for consumers that hold home














= Q(ht+1,h t)( 5 )
Deﬁning the real exchange rate as: q(ht)=e(ht)P∗(ht)/P(ht), combin-






Equation (6) relates real exchange rates and marginal rates of substitu-
tion,where χ = uc(s0)P∗(s0)/u∗
c(s0)P(s0) is a constant, reﬂecting initial
wealth diﬀerences. If PPP holds (and this will occur in the model when
η = 1), marginal utilities of consumption are equated up to a constant, χ,
as agents confront identical commodity prices. In general, movements in the
real exchange rate will be reﬂected in diﬀerent consumption rates. Hence,
even with complete ﬁnancial markets, when the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods is diﬀerent from one, it is not eﬃcient
to equalize consumption across countries because PPP does not hold.This
property is crucial for understanding the results we obtain the following
sections.
72.3 Firms
Production units are imperfectly competitive and, following Calvo (1983),
at each point in time each domestic producer is allowed to reset her price
with a constant probability, independently of the time elapsed since the last
adjustment. There are shocks to the production of the diﬀerentiated goods
at home and abroad. Producers face domestic and foreign demand for their
product, but do not engage in international price discrimination. When a













where nominal revenues are discounted by Q(ht+k,h t)=β
Qk





P(ht+k), which is the same for all consumers because of complete
markets, and 1 − γ is the probability that a monopolistic producer faces to
reset her price. z(ht)a n dz∗(ht)a r et h ed o m e s t i ca n dt h ef o r e i g np r o d u c -
tivity shocks, which are assumed to evolve according to:
ξt+1 = Γξt + εt (8)
where ξt ´= [zt,z∗
t], Etεt+1 =0 ,E tεtε0
t = D.
The sellers maximize expected returns from sales revenues, subject to








where PH(ht) is the domestic price index and C∗
F(ht) is foreign demand for
domestic goods. Staggered price setting implies the following expression for
the evolution of the domestic price index:
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The terms of trade, i.e., the price of domestic relative to foreign goods,
denoted by S(ht), equals the ratio of foreign to home prices PF(ht)/PH(ht).
2.4 The Flexible Price Equilibrium
The ﬂexible price equilibrium in loglinear form is characterized by the fol-
lowing relationships:
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σ +2 α(1 + ωψs)
i−1
ζ, ζ = −
vyz
Yv yy, ψs =[ 2 η(1 −α)−
(1−2α)
σ ] and the superscript ’n’ natural (ﬂexible price) variables.
It is easy to verify that due to risk sharing consumption across countries
will commove following a positive productivity shock, independently of its
origin. The terms of trade, on the other hand, are aﬀected by the relative
size of the two productivity shocks. For example, an increase in productivity
i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r yi so ﬀset in equilibrium by a depreciation of the terms of
trade which works as an insurance for the consumers of the foreign country.
The eﬀect of country-speciﬁc productivity shocks on both variables depends
on the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, η;t h e
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/σ; the labor supply elasticity 1/ω;
and the degree of openness of the economy, α.
In particular, when there is no home bias in consumption (α = 1
2), do-





t). However, when α < 1/2, changes in zt will increase domestic consump-
tion more than foreign consumption. Hence, asymmetric productivity shocks
produce sizeable diﬀerences in the responses of consumption across countries.
92.5 The Rigid Price Equilibrium
After loglinearizing, the optimality conditions can be collapsed into 3 equa-
tions for the domestic economy (the equations for the foreign country are
analogous)1.
ct = Etct+1 −
1
σ




(b Rt − EtπHt+1) − (b R∗
t − Etπ∗
Ht+1)=Et{∆st+1} (15)
πHt = βEtπHt+1 + κc(ct − cn




γ (1 − γβ),k c = k( σ+ω
1+θω),k s =
kα(1+ωψs)
1+θω and πHt denotes
domestic inﬂation.
Equation (14) states that aggregate demand depends on nominal interest
rates as well as expectations of domestic inﬂation and terms of trade changes.
In a closed economy the last term is absent. Equation (15) is the real interest
parity condition relating movements of the real interest rate diﬀerential to
expected variations in the relative prices.
Equation (16) represents an aggregate supply curve. In this equation
domestic inﬂation rate depends on the expectations of future price setting
and on the deviations of the terms of trade and domestic consumption from
their ﬂexible price values. These last two terms enter the speciﬁcation be-
cause they determine the path of real marginal costs in the economy. In
particular, terms of trade inﬂuence domestic inﬂation because they indi-
rectly contribute to the real marginal costs. Producers set domestic prices
but they minimize costs discounting wages with CPI prices. With no inter-
national price discrimination CPI prices are directly aﬀected by changes in
relative prices. However, as the economy becomes autarkic, the importance
of relative prices for domestic inﬂation declines (ks −→ 0a sα −→ 0)
1Lower case variables denote the percentage deviations from respective steady state
values and variables with stars denote foreign variables.
10Hence, the economy is represented by the home aggregate supply equa-
tion (16) and its foreign analogue, the domestic and foreign aggregate de-
mand equations (14), the real interest parity condition (15), and the law
of motion for the exogenous productivity shocks (8). To characterize the
equilibrium completely we next describe how monetary policy is conducted.
3 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy may have diﬀerent objectives since the equilibrium is subop-
timal both because of the market power distortion and of nominal rigidities.
I assume that employment is subsidized in equilibrium so as to neutral-
ize the monopolistic competition distortion. This is achieved by setting
τ = −(θ−1)−1. I also assume that the liquidity services of money are small.
By doing so, I eliminate the monetary distortion that would make the Fried-
man rule optimal. These modiﬁcations make the ﬂexible price equilibrium
eﬃcient2.
Optimal monetary policy entails the optimization of a social objective
function, given the aggregate constraints in the economy. A natural welfare
criterion to evaluate the losses is the discounted sum of the utility ﬂows of the
households. Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) used this criterion for closed
economy problems. The arguments of the central bank’s objective in an open
economy are diﬀerent from those of a closed economy because variations in
the relative prices aﬀect consumption across countries diﬀerently. After
tedious algebraic manipulations it is possible to show that the utility of the
2Some authors have suggested the introduction of distortionary taxation (subsidies)
to produce the right incentives when central banks use the terms of trade strategically
(See for example, Benigno and Benigno (2002)). The competitive distortion, however,
results because prices are sticky in the short-run. Under ﬂexible prices, monetary policy
is ineﬀective and central banks cannot distort allocations via manipulation of the terms of
trade. Hence, any tax or subsidy that does not completely oﬀset the distortions associated
with monopolistic competition will not produce an optimal allocation.
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Equation (17) diﬀers from the standard welfare criterion used in a closed
economy in several ways. As in a closed economy, the welfare criterion for
independent central banks depends on the deviations of consumption from
their ﬂexible price levels and on the variability of inﬂation. However, an in-
dependent central bank is also concerned with the variance of the deviations
of the terms of trade from an optimal level and its covariance with domestic
consumptions. Independent monetary authorities in an open economy do
not seek, in general, to replicate the ﬂexible price allocation.
An internationally asymmetric welfare distribution might, in fact, be in-
duced by either a depreciation above the ﬂexible price level or by making
domestic demand covary with the deviations of the terms of trade. Note
that if δ = 1, central banks in the two countries will maximize welfare by
setting consumption and terms of trade to their ﬂexible price levels. How-
ever, the coeﬃcient δ crucially depends on two parameters of the model:
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/σ, and the elasticity of sub-
stitution between home and foreign goods, η. Independently of α, δ =1
whenever η = σ =1 .
An increase in the productivity in the home country depreciates the
terms of trade and, as a result, demand for home goods increases, and this
increases domestic inﬂation. Whenever the international demand elasticity
is equal to one, consumption is equalized across countries because of risk
12sharing and, as a result, domestic consumption increases less than output
in equilibrium and this decreases domestic inﬂation 3.W h e n σ =1t h e
risk sharing eﬀect cancels out with the terms of trade eﬀect, there are no
externalities from movements in the terms of trade on domestic inﬂation,
and thus no incentives to use the former to strategically increase domestic
welfare. Note also that when the two countries are economically indepen-
dent, the additional terms disappear (α −→ 0, φs, and φsc → 0), since no
reallocation of resources across countries results from asymmetric shocks.
Some authors have argued that in an open economy it is possible to derive
a second order approximation of the consumer’s utility, which can be used
for policy evaluation in log-linear models, only when the international and
intertemporal demand elasticities are equal (see e.g. Benigno and Benigno
(2002), Gali and Monacelli (2002)). These parameter restrictions are needed
because they allow for an exact relationship between output, consumption
and relative prices that can be used into the ﬁrst order terms appearing in
the welfare approximation.
The welfare criterion I derive is valid for all possible values of these
elasticities. The approximation used omits a term in the square of the terms
of trade. Since the omitted terms are independent of policy and since in each
of the three regimes the same term is omitted, the ranking of welfare across
regimes is valid. Furthermore, while the magnitude of welfare costs in each
of the regime might not be accurate, this term is zero whenever α =1 /2, or
α is small4.
Using central banks’ objective functions (17) I will analyze the properties
of the equilibrium under alternative hypotheses regarding the way monetary
policy is conducted. I will consider three alternatives: (a) Cooperative, (b)
Non-cooperative monetary policy and (c) Monetary union.
I will assume that the policymakers can choose the entire future (state-
3See also, Clarida, Gali and Gerttler (2002).
4See Appendix 2 for details.
13contingent) evolution of the control variables, once and for all, at date zero.
In other words, I am only considering policies under commitment. The as-
sumption of commitment is important, since the private sector expectations
about the evolution of prices aﬀect the forward looking terms in equations
(14) - (16). In general, the optimal plan is not time consistent, but there
are instances when it delivers a better outcome than a time-consistent plan
that results from optimization under discretion (see, e.g. Woodford (1999)).
4 Calibration
Because the problems solved by the central banks under the diﬀerent policy
regimes do not have closed form solutions, I resort to simulations to compare
the welfare outcomes of diﬀerent arrangements. I calibrate the parameters
of the model using the United States and European economies to provide
a realistic ﬂavour to the comparison. Time is taken to be quarters and the
parameters used are reported in Table 1.
I set the discount factor β =1 .03−1/4, so as the annual real interest rate
equals 4%. The parameter θ, the elasticity of substitution among diﬀer-
entiated goods is set equal to 7.88. Since in the steady state θ equals the
mark-up of prices over marginal costs, this value implies a mark-up of 14%.
The parameter ω measures the curvature of the disutility of labor. Empir-
ical evidence suggests that wage elasticities lie in the interval [0.1, 1] (see
Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2002)). I set the elasticity of labor supply
equal to 0.3, which is smaller than the one used in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998) (ω =0 .4633) because their value implies a labor supply which is very
elastic. The degree of price stickiness, measured by γ, is set equal to 0.75,
which implies an average frequency of price adjustment of four quarters.
The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion σ is usually assumed to take values
in the interval [1,6], while the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign goods is estimated between [1,2] (see Chari et al. (1998)). In the
14benchmark preferences speciﬁcation I set σ =2a n dη =1 .5, and I perform
a sensitive analysis to study how the gains from cooperation change for
diﬀerent values of these elasticities.
To set α, note that in the symmetric steady state α = CF/CH, the share
of imported to domestic goods. The value of this parameter does not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly across Europe and the US. According to Chari et al. (1998),
imports from Europe to US are roughly 2.0% of GDP, while for Europe the
corresponding number is around 2-4% according to Eurostat data. Thus,
the assumption of symmetry appears reasonable. In the benchmark case, I
set the index of openness equal to 0.2, and perform a variety of sensitivity
experiments to access how results change when this parameter varies. Fi-
nally, the parameters of the productivity process are those obtained from
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992).
5 International Monetary Policy Regimes
5.1 Cooperative Monetary Policy (CO)
Monetary policy cooperation is modeled as the case in which policy deci-
sions are delegated to a supranational monetary institution which has the
objective of maximizing a weighted average of the welfare of the consumers in
each country. Since the two countries are symmetric, I constrain the weights
to be equal. Intuitively, consumers should be at least as well oﬀ when the
central banks cooperate as when they do not. Cooperating policymakers
can always implement the non-cooperative outcome by choosing their non-
cooperative strategies. Since that outcome is feasible under cooperation,
rational policymakers will never choose anything worse.
The problem of the central authority is to choose stochastic processes
for {ct, πHt, b Rt,c ∗
t, π∗
Ht, b R∗
t st} to maximize the weighted average of the
welfare in the two countries, as a function of the information set It,w h i c h
includes all the history and information about the evolution of the exogenous
15disturbances zt and z∗
t and subject to the constraints given by (8) and (14)-




































The social planner internalizes the externality due to the terms of trade
movements and seeks to replicate the ﬂexible price allocation. Such an
objective translates into movements of the terms of trade that mimic those
obtained under the ﬂexible price equilibrium.
The solution to the problem is:
(1 − ΓL)qt+1 =( 1− ZL)ξt+1
where qt = {ct,πHt, b Rt,c ∗
t,π∗
Ht, b R∗
t,s t,φt}, φt = {φ1t,φ2t,φ∗
1t,φ∗
2t,} is the
vector of deviations of the Lagrange multipliers from their respective steady
state values and ξt = {zt,z∗
t}. The multipliers φ1t,φ2t,φ∗
1t,φ∗
2t give the
shadow value of relaxing the aggregate demand and the aggregate supply
constraints home and abroad. Since the social planner does not inherit any
initial values for his choice variables and the aggregate constraints depend
on expectations of the choice variables, a necessary condition for the opti-
mization under commitment is φ10 = φ20 = φ∗
10 = φ∗
20 = s0 =0 .
The only distortion in the economy is the stickiness of prices and the re-
sulting inertia in relative prices. Since the social planner has two instruments
available to correct for these distortions (i.e., the nominal interest rate and
the nominal exchange rate), she can implement the ﬂexible price allocation,
which is Pareto optimal. Since the ﬁrst best is attained in the cooperative
solution, the welfare of the consumers when the two policymakers cooperate
16can be used as a benchmark for comparing the outcomes of the other policy
regimes. For this purpose I calculate the index of utility losses in terms of
the equivalent consumption decreases associated with suboptimal equilibria
(OCU, optimal consumption units in percentage terms).
Figures 1 and 2 present the responses of the domestic macroeconomic
variables to a domestic and a foreign productivity shock, respectively (the
responses of the foreign variables are similar). It is easy to verify that the
impulse response functions of the cooperative and the ﬂexible price solu-
tions are identical. A positive domestic productivity shock reduces inﬂation
at home. Since the terms of trade depreciate, demand for domestic goods
rises and thus expectations for future inﬂation. The movements in the nom-
inal interest rates are such that the latter eﬀect balances the eﬀect of the
productivity on inﬂation. As a result, inﬂation hardly moves in equilibrium.
Gali (1999) has shown that in response to a positive productivity shock,
labor productivity rises more than output and he argues that this fact can be
explained in the context of a closed economy general equilibrium model with
monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. However, in an open econ-
omy this pattern can be replicated without the need of nominal rigidities.
From Figure 1 we see that output reacts less than the change in technology
while there is a negative movement in employment. These imply that labor
productivity rises more than output.5 This outcome, however, depends on
the labor supply elasticity and on the value of σ. The demand for labor
depends on the domestic price index, while the supply of labor depends on
the aggregate price index. Under ﬂexible prices, a positive domestic pro-
ductivity shock increases labor demand and real wages. On the other hand,
because of an income eﬀect, the supply of labor decreases. In the bench-
5Collard and Dellas (2001) suggest that labor productivity responses can be replicated
in an RBC model as long as trade elasticities fall short of unity and the degree of openness
is suﬃciently high. Here, I can generate negative conditional correlation between produc-
tivity and employment without having to assume low elasticities of substitution between
home and foreign goods.
17mark speciﬁcation where the labor supply is steep these movements lead to
a reduction in domestic employment.
5.2 Non-Cooperative Monetary Policy (NC)
In a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, each monetary authority maximizes
the expected utility of its own consumers subject to the domestic economy
constraints and taking as given the policy of the foreign policymaker. The













subject to (8) and (14)-(16), the exogenous process for the productivity
shocks and given c∗
t,π∗
Ht,and b R∗
t. Since the foreign policymaker behaves sym-















The two central banks place opposite weights on the expected relative
price depreciation and the covariance between domestic spending and the
deviations of the terms of trade from its domestically optimal value. To
understand the incentives that central banks face consider the case when
terms of trade spillovers matter (i.e. δ 6=1 ) . Take η =1a n dσ > 1, for
example. Here, the risk sharing eﬀect dominates the terms of trade eﬀect
and increases of the terms of trade above potential decrease domestic inﬂa-
tion. When η > 1a n dσ = 1, a worsening of the terms of trade generates
large consumption swings towards domestic goods, so relative revenues and
consumption of the domestic consumers increase. In both cases the do-
mestic authority would want to depreciate the terms of trade in excess of
what the ﬂexible price equilibrium would require. If η and/or σ < 1, the
opposite is true and the monetary authority seeks to limit terms of trade
18movements. Finally, when η = σ = 1, there are no spillovers from terms of
trade movements and thus no incentives to deviate from the ﬂexible price
allocation.
From Figure 1 and 2 (where η,σ > 1), w es e et h a td o m e s t i cc o n s u m p -
tion and output increase more in the non-cooperative equilibrium, while
consumption in the foreign country increases less than in the ﬂexible price
equilibrium and output falls. The competition policy of the two policymak-
ers does not allow minimization of inﬂation variability in the two countries.
Domestic inﬂation increases and foreign inﬂation falls because of the con-
sumption switching towards domestic goods. While under cooperation do-
mestic and foreign employment fall independently of the origin of the shock,
in the non-cooperative equilibrium, domestic employment increases and for-
eign employment falls to satisfy the swing in consumption towards domestic
goods. If the domestic central bank internalized the eﬀects of the terms
of trade movements on domestic employment, it could increase domestic
welfare by simultaneously increasing consumption and leisure.
5.3 Monetary Union (MU)
One way to accomplish some of the beneﬁts of policy cooperation without
delegating the optimization problem to a supranational planner is through
the establishment of a monetary union. In this case, the problem of the
central bank is similar to the problem faced by the institution of the section
5.1 with the only diﬀerence that in a currency area the nominal exchange
rate is ﬁxed. Thus, monetary union can be viewed as ”cooperation with one
instrument only” - the union wide nominal interest rate.
In a monetary union the ﬁxity of the nominal exchange rate coupled with
the rigidity in prices introduces an additional distortion in the economy:
the inertia of relative prices. Notice that there is a trade-oﬀ between price
stickiness and relative price distortions, since attempts to neutralize price
stickiness, setting domestic inﬂation equal to zero, increase the distortions
19due to the inertia of the terms of trade. In the optimal allocation domestic
prices are stabilized and consumption and terms of trade are equal to their
ﬂexible price levels. In a monetary union, these three conditions cannot be
simultaneously satisﬁed (see also Figure 1 and 2). Low inﬂation variability
implies sluggish relative prices which in turn result into an ineﬃcient reaction
of output in response to foreign disturbances and thus higher consumption
variability. The nominal interest rate is also more variable, since it is the
only instrument the Central Bank can use for accommodating productivity
shocks. A positive productivity shock decreases the union-wide nominal
interest rate independently of its origin. Consequently, domestic and foreign
consumption and output commove, while employment is countercyclical.
6 How large are the gains from Cooperation?
The analysis of the previous section reveals that there are possibly gains
from cooperation, since independent monetary policies might have an in-
c e n t i v et ou s et h et e r m so ft r a d es t r a t e g ically in order to increase domestic
welfare. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001) showed that these gains are negligi-
ble even when one departs from the assumption of logarithmic utilities in a
general equilibrium model with wage rigidities and tradable and non trad-
able goods. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b) illustrated the same point for a
general equilibrium sticky price model with consumer currency pricing and
complete exchange rate pass through. However, both results are based on
the assumption of unitary international demand elasticities. Benigno and
Benigno (2002) argue that the value of the international elasticity of sub-
stitution is crucial in determining the welfare gains from cooperation and
conclude that the conditions under which non-cooperative and cooperative
equilibrium coincide are ”special.” Surprisingly, these ”special” conditions
turn out to be exactly the conditions under which it is optimal to replicate
the ﬂexible price allocation in the present framework.
20In this section I characterize the pattern of the gains from coordination
when key parameters of the model are varied within a reasonable range.
6.1 The intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of sub-
stitution
The values for the intertemporal and international demand elasticities are
crucial for determining whether the social planner’s and the independent
banks’ objectives coincide. Their magnitude determines whether there is
interdependence between the two countries from a stabilization point of
view. When there is no such interdependence the cooperative equilibrium
coincides with the non-cooperative one and there are no gains from coordi-
nation. However, when such interdependence exists, independent monetary
authorities do not internalize these externalities and there are losses due to
policy competition.
The question of interest here is how large the gains from cooperation
are when we depart from the assumption of unitary intertemporal and in-
ternational elasticities. I calculate the welfare costs of policy competition
for both the case of home bias and no home bias in consumption. In Fig-
ure 3 I plot the costs from non-cooperation for the case of no home bias in
consumption. As it is apparent, the gains from cooperation are zero locally
around η = σ = 1, while the increase whenever we depart from these points
and reach their maximum value for η =6a n dσ = 6. Empirical evidence
suggests values for σ between 3 and 10 (See, Gali,Gertler and Lopez-Salido
(2002)) and values for η in the interval [1,2] for Europe and the US (See,
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000)) are reasonable. Within these bounds
the largest loss from non- cooperation is about 0.51 percent of steady state
consumption units - not a negligible number.
216.2 The degree of openness
In the previous subsection we have assumed no home bias in consump-
tion. However, this is an extreme assumption which is somewhat contra-
dicted when we look at the data. Here I analyze how the losses from non-
cooperation change for diﬀerent degrees of home bias in consumption. Since
in the steady state the degree of home bias is closely related with the degree
of openness, I interpret my results as produced by changes in the degree of
openness of the economies. In Figure 4 I present how the degree of open-
ness aﬀects the losses from policy competition for diﬀerent values of the
intertemporal and international demand elasticity: in general, the costs of
non cooperation increase with the degree of openness of the economy. For
α =0 .02, they are close to zero independently of the values of η and σ;t h e y
increase for α =0 .15 and they reach their maximum for α =0 .5. For the
empirically relevant values of η and σ,w h e nα is reduced to 0.15, the max-
imum welfare loss drops from 0.51 to 0.35 percent of optimal consumption
units. For the calibrated value for the degree of openness of the European
and the US economies (α =0 .02) this value is only 0.06 percent of steady
state consumption.
Intuitively, for relatively closed economies the gains from cooperation
must be small. With the welfare criterion used, as the degree of openness
approaches zero the terms concerning relative prices disappear and, as a
result, optimal policy resembles the one of a closed economy. In other words,
when the two economies are almost autarkic, the reallocation of resources
in equilibrium is small and the gains from cooperation become negligible.
6.3 The correlation of shocks
To complete the analysis I have also considered whether gains from cooper-
ation change with the correlation of shocks. In the benchmark speciﬁcation
t h et w os h o c k sa r ep o s i t i v e l yc o r r e l a t e d .W h e nw ea s s u m et h a tt h es h o c k s
between the two countries are perfectly correlated the costs of non coop-
22eration are zero whatever the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities
and of the degree of openness of the economies are. (See also Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (2001)).
A negative correlation between the productivity shocks in the two economies
increases the losses from policy competition. For example, if we assume that
Corr(z,z∗) = -.258, then losses from cooperation increase for all values of σ
and η, away from the ridge of η = σ =1 , by approximately 10% and they
reach a maximum for the feasible range of parameter values of 0.60 percent of
optimal consumption units. Losses from non-cooperation are negatively re-
lated to the degree of correlation between domestic and foreign shocks. This
is because the additive asymmetry of negative correlated shocks increases
the incentives of policymakers to deviate from the ﬂexible price allocation
when the terms of trade cannot automatically pool indiosyncratic shocks.
6.4 The labor supply elasticity
Given the important role of the labour markets in determining the size of
the externalities due to misallocation of resources when ησ 6=1 ,a n dt h e
empirical and theoretical controversy over the exact value of ω,Ih a v ea l s o
examined whether the gains from cooperation change substantially for higher
values of the (Frisch) wage elasticity of the labor supply.
The welfare costs of policy competition are highly sensitive to this param-
eter. For small values of ω, welfare costs are larger than in the benchmark
speciﬁcation. For example, for the speciﬁcation of Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998) with ω =0.4633 welfare costs within the region of feasible parameter
values reach a maximum, when σ =6a n dη =2 , of 2.5% of optimal con-
sumption units. This is because low values of ω imply that the labor supply
schedule is ﬂat and the increase in labor after a positive productivity shock
is more pronounced. As a result, the lower ω t h eh i g h e rt h et h ec o s to fl a b o r
and thus, the cost of policy competition.
237 Can a Monetary Union Improve upon Non-cooperation?
For η = σ = 1 a monetary union is clearly suboptimal, since independent
monetary authorities can achieve the optimal solution without ﬁxing the
exchange rate. As in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001), unless domestic and for-
eign shocks are perfectly positively correlated, ﬁxing the exchange rate is
never optimal. Nevertheless, a monetary union can be preferable to policy
competition when the two productivity shocks are not perfectly correlated
and the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticity of substitution are in the
feasible range. In Figure 5, I plot the relative gains obtained in a mone-
tary union for the benchmark speciﬁcation. A monetary union is beneﬁcial
when non-cooperation is not. Contrary to the case of non-cooperation, the
costs of a monetary union fall as the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods increases, while they increase with σ. As mentioned, a
monetary union is associated with costs due to the ineﬃcient movements of
the terms of trade. However, when home and foreign goods have a high de-
gree of substitutability, small changes in the terms of trade can induce large
consumption switches and consequently, the loss of the exchange rate instru-
ment becomes less important. On the other hand, when σ is low, consumers
prefer to distribute consumption equally across states and across time, while
when σ is high, they want to consume more when domestic prices are low.
Consequently, for low values of σ the costs of monetary union will tend to
be higher.
In Figure 6, I plot the costs of monetary union versus the costs from
policy competition. For values of σ and η larger than 2, monetary union
produces lower costs and the relative gain increases with η.T h e r e l a t i v e
gains of a monetary union increase with the degree of openness of the econ-
omy (Figure 6 is plot for the case of α =0 .5). For low α a central bank
cannot induce large consumption switches with small changes in the terms
of trade and the optimal reallocation of resources cannot be achieved. How-
24ever, even in the case of home bias in consumption there are parameter
values for which monetary union is preferable to policy competition.
The relative gains of a monetary union also depend on the degree of
price rigidity. Other things equal, a higher degree of price rigidity implies a
higher inertia in relative prices and higher welfare costs from the ineﬃcient
reallocation of resources for the members of a monetary union. Finally, the
ranking between non-cooperation and monetary union is quite robust to
the diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the labor supply elasticity and the correlation
between home and foreign productivity shocks.
The prediction of the model that a monetary union can improve upon
non-cooperation is somewhat surprising, given that, for example, Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ (2001), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b), Devereux and Engel (2000)
have found insigniﬁcant gains from cooperation in similar models. The re-
sults I obtain are similar to those produced in the optimum currency area
literature, but the mechanics leading to this outcome are diﬀerent. Mundell
(1961) argued that the beneﬁt of a common currency area lies in minimizing
transaction costs and in facilitating the ﬂow of information about relative
prices. The oﬀsetting force was that ﬁxed exchange rates entailed a loss of
independent monetary policies. In the present framework, a common cur-
rency is beneﬁcial when there is enough substitutability between home and
foreign goods which can correct for the inertial movements of the terms of
trade due to the ﬁxity of exchange rates and the rigidity of prices. In this
case the allocation of resources across regions in a monetary union are closer
to their eﬃcient counterparts and inﬂation is more stable.
Cooperation between ECB and the FED produce negligible gains. Would
the same result hold if we ask whether UK should join the EMU? The answer
is diﬀerent in this case, because of the strong trading links between the two
areas. In this case, not only cooperation will be beneﬁcial, but gains are
also recorded when a single monetary union is created. Given the trading
links between the two economic areas and assuming that the international
25and intertemporal elasticity of substitution are the same in both areas, we
ﬁnd that adoption of the Euro will increase welfare approximately by 0.1
percent.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied the sources of conﬂict between the monetary policy
objectives of two large economies and the extent to which diﬀerent types of
international policy arrangements may help to overcome the sub-optimality
resulting from decentralized, non-cooperative decisions. I show that the
social planer will always want to replicate the ﬂexible price allocation by
setting domestic inﬂation equal to zero in both countries and in all times.
Independent monetary policies, on the other hand, seek to replicate the ﬂex-
ible price allocation only under special conditions. For values of η and σ
in the neighborhood of η = σ = 1, the gains from cooperation are negligi-
ble. However, there are empirically reasonable parameter values for which
signiﬁcant gains from cooperation can be generated.
Non-cooperation implies welfare losses because of the presence of beggar-
thy-neighbor and beggar-thyself eﬀects. The magnitude and nature of these
eﬀects depends crucially on the international demand and intratemporal
elasticities. For given values of these elasticities, the welfare costs from
non-cooperation increase with the degree of openness of the economy. As
the economy becomes autarkic, the short run adjustment role of the nominal
exchange rate is reduced and consumer prices are almost unresponsive to ex-
change rate changes. Moreover, the costs of non-cooperation are negatively
related to the correlation between home and foreign productivity shocks and
to the inverse of the labor supply elasticity.
Fixing the exchange rate introduces an additional distortion in the econ-
omy, the inertia of the terms of trade, that does not allow the optimal reallo-
cation of resources to be achieved. The adoption of a common currency has
26the potential of reducing the welfare costs of monetary policy competition
when the economies are open to trade, relatively ﬂexible, and when home
and foreign goods are highly substitutable. As long as trade interdependen-
cies between Europe and the US are as small as those experienced in the
last 50 years, cooperation between the ECB and the Fed will produce little
welfare gain. This might not true however when considering e.g. the UK
and the Euro area economies.
Finally, this paper has focused on the design of optimal monetary policy
under commitment. The assumption that the policymakers can commit
to policy before prices are set could imparts a bias on the estimates on the
potential gains from cooperation. On the one hand, setting policy in advance
implies that the cooperative institutional arrangements have no independent
impact on expectations within the domestic economies. Since the analysis
precludes such beneﬁts, it might understate the scope for international policy
cooperation. On the other hand, the ability to make commitments could
aggravate non-cooperation problems of the type described by Rogoﬀ (1985).
In this case, the paper could overstate the potential beneﬁts of international
policy cooperation. For these reasons, commitment should be an endogenous
outcome of the model, and of the arrangements among countries. Future
research studying the conditions under which this may occur may improve
our understanding of the interactions existing among open economies.
27Table 1: Benchmark Parameter values 
 
Parameter Description  Value 




σ  Relative Risk aversion coefficient   2 
η  Elasticity of substitution between home and 
foreign goods 
1.5 
θ/θ-1  Gross steady state mark-up  1.14 
1-α  Home bias in consumption  0.8 
1/ω  Elasticity of labor supply  0.3 











906 . 088 .
088 . 906 .





28Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a Domestic Productivity Shock
29Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Foreign Productivity Shock
30Figure 3: The costs of non-cooperation
Figure 4: The costs of non-cooperation and the degree of openness
31Figure 5: The Costs of Monetary Union
Figure 6: Monetary Union versus Non-Cooperation
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